We consider finite-state concurrent stochastic games, played by k ≥ 2 players for an infinite number of rounds, where in every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other players chooses an action, whereafter the successor state is determined by a probability distribution given by the current state and the chosen actions. We consider reachability objectives that given a target set of states require that some state in the target set is visited, and the dual safety objectives that given a target set require that only states in the target set are visited. We are interested in the complexity of stationary strategies measured by their patience, which is defined as the inverse of the smallest non-zero probability employed.
Introduction
Concurrent stochastic games. Concurrent stochastic games are played on finite-state graphs by k players for an infinite number of rounds. In every round, each player simultaneously and independently of the other players chooses moves (or actions). The current state and the chosen moves of the players determine a probability distribution over the successor state. The result of playing the game (or a play) is an infinite sequence of states and action vectors. These games with two players were introduced in a seminal work by Shapley [34] , and have been one of the most fundamental and well-studied game models in stochastic graph games. Matrix games (or normal form games) can model a wide range problems with diverse applications, when there is a finite number of interactions [29, 37] . Concurrent stochastic games can be viewed as a finite set of matrix games, such that the choices made in the current game determine which game is played next, and is the appropriate model for many applications [17] . Moreover, in analysis of reactive systems, concurrent games provide the appropriate model for reactive systems with components that interact synchronously [12, 13, 2] .
Objectives. An objective for a player defines the set of desired plays for the player, i.e., if a play belongs to the objective of the player, then the player wins and gets payoff 1, otherwise the player looses and gets payoff 0. The most basic objectives for concurrent games are the reachability and the safety objectives. Given a set F of states, a reachability objective with target set F requires that some state in F is visited at least once, whereas the dual safety objective with target set F requires that only states in F are visited. In this paper, we will only consider reachability and safety objectives. A zero-sum game consists of two players (player 1 and player 2), and the objectives of the players are complementary, i.e., a reachability objective with target set F for one player and a safety objective with target set complement of F for the other player. In this work, when we refer to zero-sum games we will imply that one player classes of concurrent stochastic games that admit optimal stationary strategies, namely, discounted-sum objectives, and ergodic concurrent games. For both these classes the optimal bound on patience and roundedness for ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential [11, 24] . The optimal bound on patience and roundedness for optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, for safety objectives has been an open problem. Our contributions. Our main results are as follows:
1. Lower bound: general. We show that in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, a lower bound on patience of optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, for safety objectives is doubly exponential (in contrast to the above mentioned related classes of games that admit stationary optimal strategies and require only exponential patience). We present a family of games (namely, Purgatory Duel) where the optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, for both players require doubly-exponential patience. 2. Lower bound: three states. We show that even in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with three states of which two are absorbing (sink states with only self-loop transitions) the patience required for optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential (in the number of actions). An optimal (resp., ǫ-optimal, for ǫ > 0) strategy in a game with three states (with two absorbing states) is basically an optimal (resp., ǫ-optimal) strategy of a matrix game, where some entries of the matrix game depends on the value of the non-absorbing state (as some transitions of the non-absorbing state can lead to itself). In standard matrix games, the patience for ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, is only logarithmic [27] ; and perhaps surprisingly in contrast we show that the patience for ǫ-optimal strategies in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with three states is exponential (i.e., there is a doubly-exponential increase from logarithmic to exponential). 3. Upper bound. We show that in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, an upper bound on the patience of optimal strategies and an upper bound on the patience and roundedness of ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, is as follows: (a) doubly exponential in general; and (b) exponential for the safety player if the number of value classes (i.e., the number of different values in the game) is constant. Hence our upper bounds on roundedness match our lower bound results for patience. Our results also imply that if the number of value classes is constant, then the basic decision problem is in coNP(resp., NP) if player 1 has reachability (resp., safety) objective. 4. Non-zero-sum games. We consider non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with reachability and safety objectives. First, we show that it easily follows from our example family of Purgatory Duel that if there are at least two players and there is at least one player with reachability objective, then a lower bound on patience for ǫ-Nash equilibrium is doubly exponential, for ǫ > 0, for all players. In contrast, we show that if all players have safety objectives, then the optimal bound on patience of strategies for ǫ-Nash equilibrium is exponential, for ǫ > 0 (i.e., for upper bound we show that there always exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium where the strategy of each player requires at most exponential roundedness; and there exists a family of games, where for any ǫ-Nash equilibrium the strategies of all players require at least exponential patience). In summary, we present a complete picture of the patience and roundedness required in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, and non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all players. Also see Section 7.2 for a discussion on important technical aspects of our results. Distinguishing aspects of safety and reachability. While the optimal bound on patience and roundedness we establish in zero-sum concurrent stochastic games for the safety player matches that for the reachability player, there are many distinguishing aspects for safety as compared to reachability in terms of the number of value classes (as shown in Table 1 ). For the reachability player, if there is one value class, then the patience and roundedness required is linear: it follows from the results of [7] that if there is one value class then all the values must be either 1 or 0; and if all states have value 0, then any strategy is optimal, and if all states have value 1, then it follows from [14, 8] that there is an almost-sure winning strategy (that ensures the objective with probability 1) from all states and the optimal bound on patience and roundedness is linear. The family of game graphs defined by Purgatory has two value classes, and the reachability player requires doubly exponential patience and roundedness, even for two value classes. In contrast, if there are (at most) two value classes, then again the values are 1 and 0; and in value class 1, the safety player has an optimal strategy that is stationary and deterministic (i.e., a positional strategy) and has patience and roundedness 1 [14] , and in value class 0 any strategy is optimal. While for two value classes, the patience and roundedness is 1 for the safety player, we show that for three value classes (even for three states) the patience and roundedness is exponential, and in general the patience and roundedness is doubly exponential (and such a finer characterization does not exist for reachability objectives). Finally, for non-zero-sum games (as we establish), if there are at least two players, then even in the presence of one reachability player, the patience required is at least doubly exponential, whereas if all players have safety objectives, the patience required is only exponential. Table 1 : Strategy complexity (i.e., patience and roundedness of ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0) of reachability vs safety objectives depending on the number of value classes. Our results are bold faced, and LB (resp., UB) denotes lower (resp., upper) bound on patience (resp., roundedness).
Our main ideas. Our most interesting results are the doubly-exponential and exponential lower bound on the patience and roundedness in zero-sum games. We now present a brief overview about the lower bound example. The game of Purgatory [22, 20] is a concurrent reachability game [14] that was defined as an example showing that the reachability player must, in order to play near optimally, use a strategy with non-zero probabilities that are doubly exponentially small in the number of states of the game (i.e., the patience is doubly exponential).
In this paper we present another example of a reachability game where this is the case for the safety player as well. The game Purgatory consists of a (potentially infinite) sequence of escape attempts. In an escape attempt one player is given the role of the escapee and the other player is given the role as the guard. An escape attempt consists of at most N rounds. In each round, the guard selects and hides a number between 1 and m, and the escapee must try to guess the number. If the escapee successfully guesses the number N times, the game ends with the escapee as the winner. If the escapee incorrectly guesses a number which is strictly larger than the hidden number, the game ends with the guard as the winner. Otherwise, if the escapee incorrectly guesses a number which is strictly smaller than the hidden number, the escape attempt is over and the game continues.
The game of Purgatory is such that the reachability player is always given the role of the escapee, and the safety player is always given the role of the guard. If neither player wins during an escape attempt (meaning there is an infinite number of escape attempts) the safety player wins. Purgatory may be modelled as a concurrent reachability game consisting of N non-absorbing positions in which each player has m actions. The value of each non-absorbing position is 1. This means that the reachability player has, for any ε > 0, a stationary strategy that wins from each non-absorbing position with probability at least 1 − ε [16] , but such strategies must have doubly-exponential patience. In fact for N sufficiently large and m ≥ 2, such strategies must have patience at least 2 m N/3 for ε = 1 − 4m −N/2 [20] . For the safety player however, the situation is simple: any strategy is optimal.
We introduce a game we call the Purgatory Duel in which the safety player must also use strategies of doublyexponential patience to play near optimally. The main idea of the game is that it forces the safety player to behave as a reachability player. We can describe the new game as a variation on the above description of the Purgatory game. The Purgatory Duel consists also of a (potentially infinite) sequence of escape attempts. But now, before each escape attempt the role of the escapee is given to each player with probability 1 2 , and in each escape attempt the rules are as described above. The game remains asymmetric in the sense that if neither player wins during an escape attempt, the safety player wins.
The Purgatory Duel may be modelled as a concurrent reachability game consisting of 2N + 1 non-absorbing positions, in which each player has m actions, except for a single position where the players each have just a single action. Technical contribution. The key non-trivial aspects of our proof are as follows: first, is to come up with the family of games, namely, Purgatory Duel, where the ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ ≥ 0, for the players are symmetric, even though the objectives are complementary; and then the precise analysis of the game needs to combine and extend several ideas, such as refined analysis of matrix games, and analysis of perturbed Markov decision processes (MDPs) which are one-player stochastic games. Highlights. We highlight two features of our results, namely, the surprising aspects and the significance (see Section 7.1 for further details).
1. Surprising aspects. The first surprising aspect of our result is the doubly-exponential lower bound for concurrent safety games. The properties of strategies in concurrent safety games resemble concurrent disocunted games, as in both cases optimal stationary strategies exist, and locally optimal strategies are optimal. We show that in contrast to concurrent discounted games where exponential patience suffices for concurrent safety games doubly-exponential patience is necessary. The second surprising aspect is the lower bound example itself. The lower bound example is obtained as follows: (i) given Purgatory we first obtain simplified Purgatory by changing the start state such that it deterministically goes to the next state; (ii) we then consider its dual where the roles of the players are exchanged; and (iii) Purgatory duel is obtained by merging the start states of simplified Purgatory and its dual. Both in simplified Purgatory and its dual, there are only two value classes, and positional optimal strategies exist for the safety player. Surprisingly we show that a simple merge operation gives a game with linear number of value classes and the patience increases from 1 to doubly-exponential. Finally, the properties of strategies in concurrent reachability and safety games differ substantially. An important aspect of our lower bound example is that we show how to modify an example for reachability game to obtain the result for safety games. 2. Significance. Our most important results are the lower bounds, and the main significance is threefold. First, the most well-studied way to obtain computational complexity result in games is to explicitly guess strategies, and then verify the game obtained fixing the strategy. The lower bound for concurrent reachability games by itself did not rule out that better complexity results can be obtained through better strategy complexity for safety games (indeed, for constant number of value classes, we obtain a better complexity result than known before due to the exponential bound on roundedness). Our doubly-exponential lower bound shows that in general the method of explicitly guessing strategies would require exponential space, and would not yield NP or coNP upper bounds. Second, one of the most well-studied algorithm for games is the strategy-iteration algorithm. Our result implies that any natural variant of the strategy-iteration algorithm for the safety player that explicitly compute strategies require exponential space in the worst-case. Finally, in games, strategies that are witness to the values and specify how to play the game, are as important as values, and our results establish the precise strategy complexity (matching upper bound of roundedness with lower bounds of patience). Related work. We have already discussed the relevant related works such as [30, 23, 16, 15, 22, 20, 14] on zero-sum games. We discuss relevant related works for non-zero-sum games. The computational complexity of constrained Nash equilibrium, which asks the existence of Nash (or ǫ-Nash, for ǫ > 0) equilibrium that guarantees at least a payoff vector has been studied. The constrained Nash equilibrium problem is undecidable even for turn-based stochastic games, or concurrent deterministic games with randomized strategies [35, 6] . The complexity of constrained Nash equilibrium in concurrent deterministic games with pure strategies has been studied in [4, 5] . In contrast, we study the complexity of computing some Nash equilibrium in randomized strategies in concurrent stochastic games, and our result on roundedness implies that with safety objectives for all players the approximation of some Nash equilibrium can be achieved in TFNP.
Definitions
Other number. Given a number i ∈ {1, 2} let i be the other number, i.e., if i = 1, then i = 2 and if i = 2, then i = 1. Probability distributions. A probability distribution d over a finite set Z, is a map d : Z → [0, 1], such that z∈Z d(z) = 1. Fix a probability distribution d over a set Z. The distribution d is pure (Dirac) if d(z) = 1 for some z ∈ Z and for convenience we overload the notation and let
e., the inverse of the minimum non-zero probability. The roundedness of d, if d(z) is a rational number for all z ∈ Z, is the greatest denominator of d(z). Note that roundness of d is always at least the patience of d. Given two elements z, z ′ ∈ Z, the probability distribution
. Let ∆(Z) be the set of all probability distributions over Z.
Concurrent game structure.
A concurrent game structure for k players, consists of (1) a finite set of states S, of size N ; and (2) for each state s ∈ S and each player i a set A , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k )(s ′ )) ,
i.e., the smallest non-zero transition probability. Safety and reachability objectives. Each player i, who has a safety or reachability objective, is identified by a pair (t i , S i ), where t i ∈ {Reach, Safety} and S i ⊆ S.
Concurrent games and how to play them. Fix a number k of players. A concurrent game consists of a concurrent game structure for k players and for each player i a pair (t i , S i ), identifying the type of that player. The game G, starting in state s, is played as follows: initially a pebble is placed on v 0 := s. In each time step T ≥ 0, the pebble is on some state v T and each player selects (simultaneously and independently of the other players, like in the game rock-paper-scissors) an action a i T +1 ∈ A i vT . Then, the game selects v T +1 according to the probability distribution
) and moves the pebble onto v T +1 . The game then continues with time step T + 1 (i.e., the game consists of infinitely many time steps). For a round T , let a T +1 be the vector of choices of the actions for the players, i.e., (a T +1 ) i is the choice of player i, for each i. Round 0 is identified by v 0 and round T > 0 is then identified by the pair (a T , v T ). A play P s , starting in state v 0 = s, is then a sequence of rounds
and for each ℓ a prefix of P ℓ s of length ℓ is then
and we say that P ℓ s ends in v ℓ . For each i, player i wins in the play P s , if t i = Safety and v T ∈ S i for all T ≥ 0; or if t i = Reach and v T ∈ S i , for some T ≥ 0. Otherwise, player i loses. For each i, player i tries to maximize the probability that he wins. Strategies. Fix a player i. A strategy is a recipe to choose a probability distribution over actions given a finite prefix of a play. Formally, a strategy σ i for player i is a map from P ℓ s , for a play P s of length ℓ starting at state s, to a distribution over A i v ℓ . Player i follows a strategy σ i , if given the current prefix of a play is P ℓ s , he selects a ℓ+1 according to σ i (P ℓ s ), for all plays P s starting at s and all lengths ℓ. A strategy σ i for player i, is stationary, if for all ℓ and ℓ ′ , and all pair of plays P s and P ′ s ′ , starting at states s and s ′ respectively, such that P ℓ s and (P ′ ) ℓ ′ s ′ ends in the same state t, we have that
and we write σ i (t) for the unique distribution used for prefix of plays ending in t. The patience (resp., roundedness) of a strategy σ i is the supremum of the patience (resp., roundedness) of the distribution σ i (P ℓ s ), over all plays P s starting at state s, and all lengths ℓ. Also, a strategy σ i is pure (resp., totally mixed) if σ i (P ℓ s ) is pure (resp., totally mixed), for all plays P s starting at s and all lengths ℓ. A strategy is positional if it is pure and stationary. For each player i, let Σ i be the set of all strategies for the respective player.
Strategy profiles and Nash equilibria.
A strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i is a vector of strategies, one for each player. A strategy profile σ defines a unique probability measure on plays, denoted Pr σ , when the players follow their respective strategies [36] . Let u(G, s, σ, i) be the probability that player i wins the game G when the players follow σ and the play starts in s (i.e., the utility or payoff for player i). Given a strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i and a strategy σ ′ i for player i, the strategy profile σ[σ ′ i ] is the strategy profile where the strategy for player i is σ ′ i and the strategy for player j is σ j for j = i. Fix a state s and ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ forms an ε-Nash equilibrium from state s if for all i and all strategies σ
A strategy profile σ forms an ε-Nash equilibrium if it forms an ε-Nash equilibrium from all states s. Also a strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium (resp., from state s, for some s) if it forms a 0-Nash equilibrium (resp., from state s). We say that a strategy profile has a property (e.g., is stationary) if each of the strategies in the profile has that property.
Zero-sum concurrent stochastic games
A zero-sum game consists of two players with complementary objectives. Since we only consider reachability and safety objectives, a zero-sum concurrent stochastic game consists of a two-player concurrent stochastic game with reachability objective for player 1 and the complementary safety objective for player 2 (such a game is also referred to as concurrent reachability game). Concurrent reachability game. A concurrent reachability game is a concurrent game with two players, identified by (Reach, S 1 ) and (Safety, S \ S 1 ). Observe that in such games, exactly one player wins each play (this implies that the games are zero-sum). Note that for all strategy profiles σ we have u(G, s, σ, 1) + u(G, s, σ, 2) = 1. For ease of notation and tradition, we write u(G, s, σ 1 , σ 2 ) for u(G, s, σ 1 , σ 2 , 1), for all concurrent reachability games G, states s, and strategy profiles σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Also if the game G is clear from context we drop it from the notation.
Values of concurrent reachability games. Given a concurrent reachability game G, the upper value of G starting in s is val(G, s) = sup
and the lower value of G starting in s is
As shown by [16] we have that
and this common number is called the value of s. We will sometimes write val(s) for val(G, s) if G is clear from the context. We will also write val for the vector where val s = val(s).
(ε-)optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games. For an ε ≥ 0, a strategy σ 1 for player 1 (resp., σ 2 for player 2) is called ε-optimal if for each state s we have that val
For each i, a strategy σ i for player i is called optimal if it is 0-optimal. There exist concurrent reachability games in which player 1 does not have optimal strategies, see [16] for an example 2 . On the other hand in all games G player 1 has a stationary ε-optimal strategy for each ε > 0. In all games player 2 has an optimal stationary strategy (thus also an ε-optimal stationary strategy for all ε > 0) [30, 23] . Also, given a stationary strategy σ 1 for player 1 we have that there exists a positional strategy σ 2 , such that u(s,
we only need to consider positional strategies for player 2. Similarly, we only need to consider positional strategies for player 1, if we are given a stationary strategy for player 2. (ε-)optimal strategies compared to (ε-)Nash equilibria. It is well-known and easy to see that for concurrent reachability games, a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is optimal if and only if σ forms a Nash equilibrium. Also, if σ 1 is ε-optimal and σ 2 is ε ′ -optimal, for some ε and ε ′ , then σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) forms an (ε + ε ′ )-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) forms an ε-Nash equilibrium, for some ε, then σ 1 and σ 2 are ε-optimal 3 .
Markov decision processes and Markov chains. For each player i, a Markov decision process (MDP) for player i is a concurrent game where the size of A j s is 1 for all s and j = i. A Markov chain is an MDP for each player (that is the size of A j s is 1 for all s and j). A closed recurrent set of a Markov chain G is a maximal (i.e., no closed recurrent set is a subset of another) set S ′ ⊆ S such that for all pairs of states s, s ′ ∈ S, the play starting at s reaches state s ′ eventually with probability 1 (note that it does not depend on the choices of the players as we have a Markov chain). For all starting states, eventually a closed recurrent set is reached with probability 1, and then plays stay in the closed recurrent set. Observe that fixing a stationary strategy for all but one player in a concurrent game, the resulting game is an MDP for the remaining player. Hence, fixing a stationary strategy for each player gives a Markov chain.
Matrix games and the value iteration algorithm
A (two-player, zero-sum) matrix game consists of a matrix M ∈ R r×c . We will typically let M refer to both the matrix game and the matrix and it should be clear from the context what it means. A matrix game M is played as follows: player 1 selects a row a 1 and at the same time, without knowing which row was selected by player 1, player 2 selects a column a 2 . The outcome is then M a1,a2 . Player 1 then tries to maximize the outcome and player 2 tries to minimize it. Strategies in matrix games. A strategy σ 1 (resp., σ 2 ) for player 1 (resp., player 2) is a probability distribution over the rows (resp., columns) of M . A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a pair of strategies, one for each player. Given a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) the payoff u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ) under those strategies is the expected outcome if player 1 picks row a 1 with probability σ 1 (a 1 ) and player 2 picks column a 2 with probability σ 2 (a 2 ) for each a 1 and a 2 , i.e.,
Values in matrix games. The upper value of a matrix game is val(M ) = sup σ1 inf σ2 u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ). The lower value of a matrix game is val(M ) = inf σ2 sup σ1 a1 u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ). One of the most fundamental results in game theory, as shown by [37] , is that val(M ) := val(M ) = val(M ). This common number is called the value.
(ε-)optimal strategies in matrix games. A strategy σ 1 for player 1 is ε-optimal, for some number
Similarly, a strategy σ 2 for player 2 is ε-optimal, for some number
A strategy is optimal if it is 0-optimal. There exists an optimal strategy for each player in all matrix games [37] . Given an optimal strategy σ 1 for player 1, consider the vector v, such that v j = u(M, σ 1 , j) for each column j. Then we have that v j = val(M ) for each j such that there exists an optimal strategy σ 2 for player 2, where σ 2 (j) > 0. Similar analysis holds for optimal strategies of player 2. This also shows that given an optimal strategy σ 1 for player 1 we have that u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ) is minimized for some pure strategy σ 2 and similarly for optimal strategies σ 2 for player 2. Given a matrix game M , an optimal strategy for each player and the value of M can be computed in polynomial time using linear programming. [val] . As shown by [30, 23] , each optimal stationary strategy σ 2 for player 2 in G is such that for each state s the distribution σ 2 (s) is an optimal strategy in the matrix game A s . Also, conversely, if σ 2 (s) is an optimal strategy in A s for each s, then σ 2 is an optimal stationary strategy in G. Furthermore, also as shown by [30, 23] , we have that val(s) = val(A s ) for each state s.
The value iteration algorithm. The conceptually simplest algorithm for concurrent reachability games is the value iteration algorithm, which is an iterative approximation algorithm. The idea is as follows: Given a concurrent reachability game G, consider the game G t where a time-limit t (some non-negative integer) has been introduced. The game G t is then played as G, except that player 2 wins if the time-limit is exceeded (i.e., he wins after round t unless a state in S 1 has been reached before that). (The game G t has a value like in the above definition of matrix games since the game only has a finite number of pure strategies and thus can be reduced to a matrix game). The value of G t starting in state s then converges to the value of G starting in s as t goes to infinity as shown by [16] . More precisely, the algorithm is defined on a vector v t which is the vector where v t s is the value of G t starting in s. We can compute v t s recursively for increasing t as follows
We have that v t s ≤ v t+1 s ≤ val(s) for all t and s, and for all s we have lim t→∞ v t s = val(s), as shown by [16] . As shown by [20, 21] 
Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Lower Bound
In this section we will establish the doubly-exponential lower bound on patience for zero-sum concurrent stochastic games. First we define the game family, namely, Purgatory Duel and we also recall the family Purgatory that will be used in our proofs. We split our proof about the patience in Purgatory Duel in three parts. First we present some refined analysis of matrix games, and use the analysis to first prove the lower bound for optimal strategies, and then for ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0. The Purgatory Duel. In this paper we specifically focus on the following concurrent reachability game, the Purgatory Duel 4 , defined on a pair of parameters (n, m). The game consists of N = 2n + 3 states, namely {v 
There is an illustration of the Purgatory Duel with m = n = 2 in Figure 6 . The game Purgatory. We will also use the game Purgatory as defined by [20] (and also in [22] for the case of m = 2). Purgatory is similar to the Purgatory Duel and hence the similarity in names. Purgatory is also defined on a pair of parameters (n, m). The game consists of N = n + 2 states, namely, {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , ⊤, ⊥} and each state is deterministic. To simplify the definition of the game, let v n+1 = ⊤. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the state v j is such that
. . , m} and for each a 1 , a 2 we have that
The states ⊤ and ⊥ are absorbing. Furthermore, S 1 = {⊤}. There is an illustration of Purgatory with m = n = 2 in Figure 2 .
Analysis of matrix games
In this section we present some refined analysis of some simple matrix games, which we use in the later sections to find optimal strategies for the players and the values of the states in the Purgatory Duel. 
We first explain the significance of the matrix game M x,y,z,m in relation to Purgatory Duel. Consider the Purgatory Duel defined on parameters (n, m), for some n. We will later establish that for any j, let v (resp., v ′ ) be state v 
. In this section we show that for 0 < z < y we have that M = M 0,y,z,m is such that val(M ) > z and each optimal strategy for either player is totally mixed. Similarly, for
′ ,m is such that val(M ′ ) < z and each optimal strategy for either player is totally mixed. We also compute the value and the patience of each optimal strategy in the matrix game M 0, Proof. Let ε > 0 be some number to be defined later. Consider the probability distribution σ ε 1 given by
If player 2 plays column a against
For any ε such that y · (1 − ε) > z, the payoff is strictly greater than z implying that the value of M is strictly greater than z.
Lemma 3.
For all positive integers m and reals y and z such that 0 < z < y, each optimal strategy for player 1 in the matrix game M 0,y,z,m is totally mixed.
Proof. Consider some strategy σ 1 for player 1 in M 0,y,z,m which is not totally mixed. Thus there exists some row a, where σ 1 (a) = 0. Consider the pure strategy σ 2 that plays column a with probability 1. Playing σ 1 against σ 2 ensures that each outcome is either z or 0, i.e., the payoff is at most z which is strictly less than the value by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4.
For all positive integers m and reals y and z such that 0 < z < y, each optimal strategy for player 2 in the matrix game M = M 0,y,z,m is totally mixed.
Proof. Given a strategy σ 1 for player 1 and two rows a ′ and a ′′ , let the strategy σ 1 [a ′ → a ′′ ] be the strategy where the probability mass on a ′ is moved to a ′′ , i.e.,
Consider some optimal totally mixed strategy σ 1 for player 1, which exists by Lemma 3 and let v be the value of M . Consider some strategy σ 2 for player 2 such that u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ) = v, but σ 2 is not totally mixed. We will argue that σ 2 is not optimal. This shows that any optimal strategy σ * 2 is totally mixed, since any optimal strategy σ 2 is such that
where the second equality comes from that σ ′ 1 (1) = 0. The inequality comes from that y > z. Also, the payoff
is not different from σ 1 on those actions. We can then find the payoff u(M, σ
where the second equality comes from that b ′′ is the first action σ 2 plays with positive probability. Since the payoff u(M, σ 1 , σ 2 ) is the value, by definition of σ 2 , and the payoff u(M, σ ′ 1 , σ 2 ) is strictly more, the strategy σ 2 cannot be optimal. This completes the case where b ′ = 1. The case where b ′ = 1 follows similarly but considers σ
Lemma 5. For all positive integers m and 0 < ε ≤ • Property 1. The patience of any optimal strategy is (i) at least (2ε) −m+1 and (ii) decreasing in ε.
• Property 2. The value is (i) at most
• Property 3. Any optimal strategy σ 1 for player 1 (resp., σ 2 for player 2) is such that
• Property 4. For ε = Proof. Let σ i be an optimal strategy for player i in M , for each i. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 the strategy σ i is totally mixed for each i. We can therefore consider the vector v. Recall that v j = u(M, σ 1 , j) and that for each j such that
and thus the patience is 1/σ 1 (m). Also, since σ 1 is a probability distribution
We then get that
We have that
is decreasing in ε. This indicates that σ 1 (m) is increasing in ε and thus the patience is decreasing in ε. This shows (ii) of Property 1 for player 1. We also have that val(M ) = v m indicating that
and thus, the value is increasing in ε (because ε and σ 1 (m) both are). This shows (ii) of Property 2.
Also, we get that,
where p is some polynomial of degree m − 1 in which all terms have a positive sign (p is found by multiplying out
Thus, the patience is at least (2ε) −m+1 . This shows (i) of Property 1 for player 1.
Furthermore, we can also consider the vector v ′ such that v ′ j = u(M, j, σ 2 ) for all j (which like v has all entries equal to val(M )). Since the expression, when σ 2 is taken to be an unknown vector, for the j'th entry of v ′ is the same as for the m + 1 − j'th entry of v, when σ 1 is taken to be an unknown vector, we see that σ 1 (a) = σ 2 (m + 1 − a), implying that the patience of player 2's optimal strategies is also at least (2ε) −m+1 and that it is decreasing in ε. This shows Property 1 for player 2.
Observe that since the value is above 1 2 , by Lemma 2, we have that σ 1 (1) > 1 2 (because otherwise, if player 2 plays 1 with probability 1, the payoff will not be above Similarly to above, we also get that σ 2 (m) = • The value val(M ) < z.
• Each optimal strategy σ i for player i is such that there exists an optimal strategy σ i for player
Proof. Let a positive integer m and reals y and z such that 1 > z > y be given. Consider M and let v be the value of M . Exchange the roles of the players by exchanging the rows and columns and multiply the matrix by −1. We get the matrix
We then have that each optimal strategy σ 1 in M is an optimal strategy for player 2 in M 1 and similarly, each optimal strategy σ 2 for player 2 in M is an optimal strategy for player 1 in M 1 (and vice versa). Also, the value
For each i, and for any optimal strategy σ i for player i in M 1 the strategy σ ′ i is optimal for player i in M 2 , where σ ′ i (a) = σ i (m + 1 − a) for each a (and vice versa). Also, the value v 2 of M 2 is v 2 := v 1 = −v. Next, let M 3 be the matrix M 2 where we add 1 to each entry, i.e.,
For each i, it is clear that an optimal strategy in σ i for player i in M 2 is an optimal strategy for player i in M 3 and that the value v 3 is v 3 := 1 + v 2 = 1 − v. Also, we see that M 3 = M 0,1−y,1−z,m and that 0 < 1 − z < 1 − y. We then get that 1 − v > 1 − z from Lemma 2 and thus v < z.
The patience of optimal strategies
In this section we present an approximation of the values of the states and the patience of the optimal strategies in the Purgatory Duel. We first show that the values of the states (besides ⊤ and ⊥) are strictly between 0 and 1. Next we show that every optimal stationary strategy for player 2 must be totally mixed. 
Lemma 7. Each state
),val(vs),m and for i = 2 we have that
),val(vs),m . Consider first i = 1. We will show using induction in j (with base case j = n and proceeding downwards), that val(v Proof. In the Markov chain defined by the game and σ i and σ i , we have that there are at most two closed recurrent sets, namely, the one consisting of only ⊤ and the one consisting of only ⊥. The reasoning is as follows: If either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached, then the respective state will not be left. Also, for each j, since σ i is totally mixed there is a positive probability to go to either v
(the remaining probability goes to v s ). The probability to go from v s to v i ′ 1 in one step is 1 2 . Also if neither ⊤ nor ⊥ has been reached, then v s is visited after at most n + 1 steps. Hence, in every n + 1 steps there is a positive probability that in the next n + 1 steps either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached (i.e., from v s there is a positive probability that the next states are either (i) v
). This shows that eventually either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached with probability 1.
Remark 10. Note that Lemma 9 only requires that the strategy σ i is totally mixed on one "side" of the Purgatory Duel. For the purpose of this section, we do not use that it only requires one side to be totally mixed, since we only use the result for optimal strategies for player 2, which are totally mixed by Lemma 8. However the lemma will be reused in the next section, where the one sidedness property will be useful.
The following definition basically "mirrors" a strategy σ i for player i, for each i and gives it to the other player. We show (in Lemma 12) that if σ 2 is optimal for player 2, then the mirror strategy is optimal for player 1. We also show that if σ 2 is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2, for 0 < ε < 
We next show that player 1 has optimal stationary strategies in the Purgatory Duel and give expressions for the values of states. 
Proof. Consider some optimal stationary strategy σ 2 for player 2. It is thus totally mixed, by Lemma 8. Let σ 1 = σ σ2 1 be the mirror strategy for player 1.
Playing σ 1 against σ 2 and starting in v s we see that we have probability 1 2 to reach ⊤ and probability 1 2 to reach ⊥, by symmetry and Lemma 9. This shows that the value is at least 1 2 because σ 2 is optimal. On the other hand, consider some stationary strategy σ , then the probability to eventually reach ⊥ is equal to the probability to eventually reach ⊤ and then there is some probability p (perhaps 0) that neither will be reached. The payoff u(v s , σ
. This shows that player 1 cannot ensure value strictly more than 1 2 , which is then the value of v s . Finally, we argue that σ 1 is optimal. If not, then consider σ * 2 such that u(v s , σ 1 , σ * 2 , 1) < 1/2, and then the mirror strategy σ *
Similarly, for any i, j, playing σ 1 against σ 2 and starting in v i j we see that the probability with which we reach ⊤ is equal to the probability of reaching ⊥ starting in v i j and vice versa, by symmetry. Also, by Lemma 9 the probability to eventually reach either ⊥ or ⊤ is 1. Observe that the probability to reach ⊥ starting in v i j is at least 1 − val(v i j ), by optimality of σ 2 and that with probability 1 either ⊥ is reached or ⊤ is reached. Also, again because σ 2 is optimal, the probability to reach ⊤ starting in v Proof. Consider some optimal stationary strategy σ 2 for player 2. We will show using induction in j that val(v 1
Induction case, j ≤ n − 1: We see that the matrix 
and that the patience of M ′ (and thus M ) is at least
This completes the proof. 
The patience of ε-optimal strategies
In this section we consider the patience of ε-optimal strategies for 0 < ε < 
We now show that if we mirror an ε-optimal strategy, then we get an ε-optimal strategy.
Lemma 16. For all
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 1 3 and let σ 2 be some ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2. Also, let σ 1 = σ σ2 1 be the mirror strategy.
By Lemma 15 the strategy σ 2 is such that σ 2 (v 2 j ) is totally mixed, for all j. We can then apply Lemma 9 and get that either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached with probability 1. Hence, since σ 2 is ε-optimal we reach ⊥ with probability at least 1 − val(v) − ε starting in v against all strategies for player 1, for each v. It is clear that any play P of σ 2 against any given strategy σ 
such that in round i we have that P i = f (P ′ i ) and the plays are equally likely. Thus, the probability to reach f (⊥) = ⊤, starting in state f (v), for each v is at least 1 − val(v) − ε = val(f (v)) − ε, where the equality follows from Lemma 12. Hence, σ 1 is ε-optimal for player 1.
Next we give a definition and a lemma, which is similar to Lemma 6 in [25] . The purpose of the lemma is to identify certain cases where one can change the transition function of an MDP in a specific way and obtain a new MDP with larger values. We cannot simply obtain the result from Lemma 6 in [25] , since the direction is opposite (i.e., Lemma 6 in [25] considers some cases where one can change the transition function and obtain a new MDP with smaller values) and our lemma is also for a slightly more general class of MDPs. 
(2) For all states s, we have that
Proof. We first present the proof of first item. We will show, using induction in
by definition for such a ′ (the statement is true for all time limits and thus also for t − 1). For all other actions a ′′ we have that
We then have, using the recursive definition of v t s , that
where we just argued the first inequality; and the second inequality comes from the induction hypothesis and that each factor is positive. (Note that the optimal strategy for player 2 in a matrix game A s [v t−1 ] of 1 row is to pick one of the columns with the smallest entry with probability 1 and thus
s ′ ) and similarly for v ′ t s ). This completes the proof of the first item. The second item follows from the first item and since the value of a time limited game goes to the value of the game without the time limit as the time limit grows to ∞, as shown by [16] .
We next show that for player 1, the patience of ε-optimal strategies is high. Proof. Consider some ε-optimal stationary strategy σ 1 for player 1 in the Purgatory Duel. Fixing σ 1 for player 1 in the Purgatory Duel we obtain an MDP G ′ for player 2. Let v t be the value vector for G ′ with finite horizon (time-limit) t and let δ be the transition function for G ′ . For each i, let
(Note that δ i is the same probability distribution as δ(v 2 n , i), except that the probability mass on ⊥ is moved to v s .) Consider the replacement set Q = {(v . We have for all t and i that
for all t and the only difference between δ(v 2 n , i) and δ i is that the probability mass on ⊥ is moved to v s . We then get from Lemma 18 (2) 
. It is easy to see that σ 2 plays action 1 in v 2 j for all j, because the best player 2 can hope for is to get back to v s since ⊥ cannot be reached from v It was shown by [20] that the patience of ε-optimal strategies for Purgatory with n = 1 Purgatory state is 2 Ω(m) , and thus similarly for the Purgatory Duel with N = 5.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section. Proof. The statement for strategies for player 1 follows from Lemma 19. By Lemma 16, for each ε-optimal strategy for player 2, there is an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 (i.e., the mirror strategy) with the same patience. Thus the result follows for strategies for player 2.
Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Lower Bound for Three States
In this section we show that the patience of all ε-optimal strategies, for all 0 < ε < 1 3 , for both players in a concurrent reachability game G with three states of which two are absorbing, and the non-absorbing state has m actions for each player, can be as large as 2 Ω(m) . The proof consists of two phases, first we show the lower bound in a game with at most m 2 actions for each player; and second, we show that all but 2m − 1 actions can be removed for both players in the game without changing the patience.
The first game, the 3-state Purgatory Duel, is intuitively speaking the Purgatory Duel for N = 5, where we replace the states v 
Also, let δ ′ be the transition function for the Purgatory Duel with N = 5. Let p be the function that given a state in {v s , ⊥, ⊤} in the Purgatory Duel for i = 1 outputs the primed state (which is then a state in the 3-state Purgatory Duel 
To make the game easier to understand on its own, we now give a more elaborate description of the transition function δ without using the transition function for the Purgatory Duel. To make the pattern as clear as possible we write U(s, s) instead of s for all s. Furthermore, S 1 = {⊤ ′ }. We will use τ i for strategies in the 3-state Purgatory Duel to distinguish them from strategies in the Purgatory Duel. There is an illustration of the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 and m = 2 in Figure 3 and the corresponding 3-state Purgatory Duel in Figure 4 .
Given a strategy τ i for player i in the 3-state Purgatory Duel we define the strategy σ i in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5 which is the projection of τ i and vice versa (note that the other direction maps to a set of strategies). Proof. The patience of ε-optimal strategies, for 0 < ε < The restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel. The above corollary only shows that the for the 3-state Purgatory Duel, in which one state have m 2 actions and others have 1, the patience is at least 2 Ω(m) . We now show how to decrease the number of actions from quadratic down to linear, while keeping the same patience.
From Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we see that for any optimal strategy σ 1 for player 1 (resp., σ 2 for player 2) in the Purgatory Duel with N = 5, we have that σ 1 (v 
Observe that |R 1 | = |R 2 | = 2m−1. We say that a strategy for player i, for each i, is restricted if the strategy uses only actions in R i . The sub-matrix corresponding to the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel for m = 2 is depicted as the grey sub-matrix in Figure 4 . This suggests the definition of the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel, which is like the 3-state Purgatory Duel, except that the strategies for the players are restricted. We next show that ε-optimal strategies in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel also have high patience (note, that while this is perhaps not surprising, it does not follow directly from the similar result for the 3-state Purgatory Duel, since it is possible that the restriction removes the optimal best reply to some strategy which would otherwise not be ε-optimal). The key idea of the proof is as follows: (i) we show that the patience of player i in the 3-state Purgatory Duel remains unchanged even if only the opponent is enforced to use restricted strategies; and (ii) each player has a restricted strategy that is optimal in the 3-state Purgatory Duel as well as in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel. Proof. Each player has a restricted strategy which is optimal in the 3-state Purgatory Duel and ensures value 1 2 . Thus, these strategies must still be optimal in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel and still ensure value Lemma 25. Let τ 2 be an ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel, for
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 1 2 . Let τ 2 be a stationary strategy in the 3-state Purgatory Duel (note, we do not require that τ 2 is restricted), such that there exists an a 2 for which a1 τ 2 (v ′ s )((a 1 , a 2 )) = 0. Let a ′ be smallest such a 2 .
Fix 0 < η < 1 2 − ε. We show that there exists a restricted stationary strategy τ 1 for player 1, ensuring that the payoff is at least 1 − η > Consider the rounds where the next state is defined by the first component. In such rounds ⊤ is reached with probability (1 − η) · p, for some p > 0 and ⊥ is reached with probability at most η · p, because player 1 follows an η-optimal strategy in Purgatory on the first component. But in expectation, in every second round the first component is used and thus ⊤ is reached with probability at least 1 − η, which shows that σ 2 is not ε-optimal.
In case (ii), consider the strategy τ 1 , such that τ 1 (v ′ > 1 and player 2 always plays something else and 1 with positive probability. But in expectation, in every second round the second component is used and hence ⊤ is reached with probability 1 eventually, which shows that σ 2 is not ε-optimal.
We will now define how to mirror strategies in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel. 2 , a 1 ) ) for each a 1 and a 2 . We next show that each ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 can be mirrored to an ε-optimal stationary for player 1. The statement and the proof idea are similar to Lemma 16, but since the strategies for the players are restricted here, there are some differences.
Lemma 27. For all 0 < ε < 1 be the mirror strategy for player 1 given τ * 2 and let τ 2 be an optimal best reply to τ * 1 . Let τ 1 = τ τ2 1 be the mirror strategy for player 1 given τ 2 . Observe that eventually either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached with probability 1, when playing τ * 1 against τ 2 , by Lemma 25 and the construction of the game (since there is a positive probability that the second component matches in every round in which the play is in v
2 is ε-optimal. This indicates that ⊤ ′ is reached with probability at most 1 2 + ε when playing τ 1 against τ * 2 . Hence, by symmetry ⊥ ′ is reached with probability at most 1 2 + ε when playing τ * 1 against τ 2 . Thus, since ⊥ ′ or ⊤ ′ is reached with probability 1, we have that u(v
We next show that ε-optimal stationary strategies for player 1 requires high (exponential) patience. The statement and the proof idea are similar to Lemma 19, but since the players strategies are restricted here, there are some differences.
Lemma 28. For all 0 < ε < Proof. Fix some 0 < ε < 1 3 and some ε-optimal stationary strategy σ 1 for player 1 in the restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel. The restricted 3-state Purgatory Duel then turns into an MDP M for player 2 and we can apply Lemma 18 (2) . We have that p = a 1
2 )/2 is the probability that player 1 plays an action with second component a 
Consider the MDP M ′ , which is equal to M , except that it uses the distribution d
. By Lemma 18 (2) we have that
It is clear that player 2 has an optimal positional strategy in M ′ that plays (a We are now ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 29. For all 0 < ε < Proof. By Lemma 28, the statement is true for every ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 1. By Lemma 27, every ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 corresponds to an ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 1, with the same patience, and thus every ε-optimal stationary strategy for player 2 has patience 2 Ω(m) .
Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Patience Upper Bound
In this section we give upper bounds on the patience of optimal and ε-optimal stationary strategies in a zero-sum concurrent reachability game G for the safety player. Our exposition here makes heavy use of the setup of Hansen et al. [21] and will for that reason not be fully self-contained. We assume for concreteness that the player 1 is the reachability player and player 2 the safety player. Hansen et al. showed [21, Corollary 42] for the more general class of Everett's recursive games [16] that each player has an ε-optimal stationary strategy of doubly-exponential patience. More precisely, if all probabilities have bit-size at most τ , then each player has an ε-optimal strategy of patience bounded by (
. For zero-sum concurrent reachability games the safety player is guaranteed to have an optimal stationary strategy [30, 23] . Using this fact one may use directly the results of Hansen et al. to show that the safety player has an optimal strategy of patience bounded by (
. We shall below refine this latter upper bound in terms of the number of value classes of the game. The overall approach in deriving this is the same, namely we use the general machinery of real algebraic geometry and semi-algebraic geometry [3] to derive our bounds. In order to do this we derive a formula in the first order theory of the real numbers that uniquely defines the value of the game, and from the value of the game we can express the optimal strategies. The improved bound is obtained by presenting a formula where the number of variables depend only on the number of value classes rather than the number of states.
Let below N denote the number of non-absorbing states, and m ≥ 2 the maximum number of actions in a state for either player. Assume that all probabilities are rational numbers with numerators and denominators of bit-size at most τ , where the bit-size of a positive integer n is given by ⌊lg n⌋ + 1. We let K denote the number of value classes. We number the non-absorbing states 1, . . . , N and assume that both players have the actions {1, . . . , m} in each of these states. For a non-negative integer z, define bit(z) = ⌈lg z⌉.
Given valuations v 1 , . . . , v N for the non-absorbing states, we define for each state k a m × m matrix game
letting entry (i, j) be s is the probability of a transition to a state where the reachability player wins, given actions i and j in state k. The value mapping operator M :
) . Everett showed that the value vector of his recursive games are given by the unique critical vector, which in turn is defined using the value mapping. We will instead for concurrent reachability games use the characterization of the value vector as the coordinate-wise least fixpoint of the value mapping. The value vector v is thus characterized by the formula
Similarly to [21, proof of Theorem 13] we obtain the following statement. Now, if we instead introduce a variable for each value class, we can express M (v) = v using only K free variables, by identifying variables of the same value class. For w ∈ R K , let v(w) ∈ R N denote the vector obtained by letting the coordinates corresponding to value class j be assigned w j . We thus simply express M (v(w)) = v(w) instead. Combining this with (1) we obtain the final formula. First we use Theorem 14.16 of Basu, Pollack, and Roy [3] obtaining a quantifier free formula with K variables, expressing that w(v) is the value of G. Next we use Theorem 13.11 of [3] to obtain a univariate representation of w such that v(w) is the value vector of G. That is, we obtain univariate real polynomials f, g 0 , . . . , g K , where f and g 0 are coprime, such that w = (g 1 (t)/g 0 (t), . . . , g K (t)/g 0 (t)), where t is a root of f . These polynomial are of degree m
and their coefficients have bit-size τ m
. Our next task is to recover from w an optimal strategy for the safety player. For this we just need to select optimal strategies for the column player in each of the matrix games A k (v(w)). Such optimal strategies correspond to basic feasible solutions of standard linear programs for computing the value and optimal strategies of matrix games (cf. [21, Lemma 3] ). This means that there exists (m + 1) × (m + 1) matrices
is an optimal strategy for the column player in
, where (M k (w)) i denotes the matrix obtained from M k (w) by replacing column i with the (m + 1)th unit vector e m+1 . As the matrices M 1 (w), . . . , M k (w) are obtained from the matrix games A 1 (v(w)), . . . , A N (v(w)), the entries are degree 1 polynomial in w and having rational coefficients with numerators and denominators of bit-size at most τ as well. Using a simple bound on determinants [3, Proposition 8.12] , and substituting the expression g j (t)/g 0 (t) for w j for each j, we obtain a univariate representation of (q In general the probabilities of this optimal strategy will be irrational numbers. However we may employ the rounding scheme as explained in Lemma 14 and Theorem 15 of Hansen, Koucký, and Miltersen [22] to obtain a rational ε-optimal strategy. Letting ε = 2 −ℓ we may round each probability, except the largest, upwards to L = lg Corollary 34. Let G be as in Theorem 32. Then there is an ε-optimal strategy for the safety player where each probability is a rational number with a common denominator of magnitude at most
We now address the basic decision problem. Let s be a state and let λ be a rational number with numerator and denominator of bit-size at most κ, and consider the task of deciding whether v 2 (s) 
(s) > λ). Now, if we fix K to be a constant and consider the promise problem that G has at most K value classes, then a rational η/2-optimal strategy σ 2 exists with numerators and denominators of polynomial bit-size by Corollary 34. Now, by simply guessing non-deterministically the strategy σ 2 and verifying as above we have the following result. Note that interestingly it does not follow similarly that the promise problem is in (coNP ∩ NP), because the games are not symmetric.
Remark 36 (Complexity of approximation for constant value classes). As a direct consequence we have that for a
game G promised to have at most K value classes, the value of a state can be approximated in FP NP . This improves on the FNP NP bound of Frederiksen and Miltersen [18] (that holds in general with no restriction on the number of value classes).
Non-Zero-sum Concurrent Stochastic Games: Bounds on Patience and Roundedness
In this section we consider non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games where each player has either a reachability or a safety objective. We first present a remark on the lower bound in the presence of even a single player with reachability objective, and then for the rest of the section focus on non-zero-sum games where all players have safety objectives.
Remark 37. In non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, with at least two players, even if there is one player with reachability objectives, then at least doubly-exponential patience is required for ε-Nash equilibrium strategies. We have the property if k = 2 and one player is a reachability player and the other is a safety player, from Section 3.3. It is also easy to see that Lemma 9 together with Lemma 15 imply that if player 1 is identified with the objective
(Reach, {⊤}) and player 2 is identified with the objective (Reach, {⊥}) and they are playing the Purgatory Duel, then each strategy profile σ, that forms a ε-Nash equilibrium, for any 0 < ε < . This is because player 2 has a harder objective (a subset of the plays satisfies it) than in Section 3.3, but can still ensure the same payoff (by using an optimal strategy for player 2 in the concurrent reachability variant, which ensures that ⊥ is reached with probability at least 1 2 ). In this case, we say that a strategy is optimal (resp., ε-optimal) for a player, if it is optimal (resp., ε-optimal) for the corresponding player in the concurrent reachability version. It is clear that only if both strategies are optimal (resp., ε-optimal), then the strategies forms a Nash equilibrium (resp., ε-Nash equilibrium The rest of the section is devoted to non-zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with safety objectives for all players, and first we establish an exponential upper bound on patience and then an exponential lower bound for ε-Nash equilibrium strategies, for ε > 0.
Exponential upper bound on roundedness
In this section we consider non-zero-sum concurrent safety games, with k ≥ 2 players, and such games are also called stay-in-a-set games, by [33] . We will argue that, for all 0 < ε < 1 4 , in any such game, there exists a strategy profile σ that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium and have roundedness at most
Note that the roundedness is only exponential, as compared to the doubly-exponential patience when there is at least one reachability player (Remark 37). Note that the bound is polynomial in m and k; and also polynomial in n if δ min = 1.
Players already lost, and all winners. For a prefix of a play P Player-stationary strategies. As shown by [33] , there exists a strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i that forms a Nash equilibrium. They show that the strategy σ i , for any player i, in the witness Nash equilibrium strategy profile has the following properties: For each set of players Π and state s, there exists a probability distribution σ i (Π, s), such that for each prefix of a play P ℓ ′ s , play P s and length
e., the strategy only depends on the players who have not lost yet and the current state). Also, there exists some positional strategy σ
, for all i ∈ Π (i.e., players who have lost already play some fixed positional strategy). This allows them to only consider the sub-game G Π , which is the game in which each player i not in Π plays σ ′ i . Also, if there is a strategy profile which ensures that each player in Π wins with probability 1 if the play starts in s of G Π , then the probability distribution σ i (Π, s) is pure 5 and it ensures that the players in Π wins with probability 1. We call strategies with these properties player-stationary strategies. The real number ε and the length ℓ. In the remainder of this section, fix 0 < ε < 1 4 and fix the length ℓ, such that
We will, in Lemma 39, argue that any player-stationary strategy is such that with probability 1 − ε no player loses after ℓ steps. Also several lemmas in this section will use ℓ and ε.
The event E(P 
Note that T above depends on the play P s . It is straightforward that players can lose at most k times in any play P s , simply because there are at most k players, and if the remaining players win with probability 1 in round T , then they also win with probability 1 in round T + 1, by construction of σ. Proof overview. Our proof will proceed as follows. Consider the game, while the players play some player-stationary strategy profile that forms a Nash equilibria. First, we show that it is unlikely (low-probability event) that the players do not play positional (like they do if the event W (P ℓ ′ s ) has happened) after some exponential number of steps. Second, we show that if we change each of the probabilities used by an exponentially small amount as compared to the Nash equilibria, then it is unlikely that that there will be a large difference in the first exponentially many steps. This allows us to round the probabilities to exponentially small probabilities while the players only lose little.
Lemma 39. Fix some player-stationary strategy profile σ. Consider the set P of plays P s , under σ, such that W (P ℓ s ) does not happen. Then, the probability Pr σ [P ] is less than ε/4.
Proof. Fix 0 < ε < 1 2 and a player-stationary strategy profile σ. Let c = − ln(ε/(4k)) · (δ min ) −n > 1. We will argue that the event E(P ℓ ′ s ) happens at least k times with probability at least 1 − ε/4 over c · n · k = ℓ steps. We consider two cases, either δ min = 1 or 0 < δ min < 1. If δ min = 1, the event ∃1 ≤ T ≤ n : E(P ℓ ′ +T s ) always happens (otherwise, in case it did not in some play, then a deterministic cycle satisfying the safety objectives of all players who have not lost yet is executed, and then the players could win by playing whatever they did the last time they were in a given state). If 0 < δ min < 1, we see that c ≥ c ′ = ln(ε/(4k)) ln(1−(δmin) −n ) , since 1 + x ≤ e x and that
) happens with probability at least 1 − ε/(4k) by Lemma 38. In either case, we have that the event ∃1 ≤ T ≤ c · n : E(P ℓ ′ +T s ) happens with probability at least 1 − ε/(4k). Next, split the plays up in epochs of length c · n each, and we get that the event E(P T s ) happens at least once for T ranging over the steps of an epoch with probability at least 1 − ε/(4k) and hence happens at least once in each of the first k epochs with probability at least 1 − ε/4 using union bound. At that point the remaining players win with probability 1. The first k epochs have length c · k · n = ℓ and the lemma follows.
We use the above lemma to show that any strategy profile close to a Nash equilibrium ensures payoffs close to that equilibrium. To do so, we use coupling (similar to [11] ). Variation distance. The variation distance is a measure of the similarity between two distributions. Given a finite set Z, and two distributions d 1 and d 2 over Z, the variation distance of the distributions is
We will extend the notion of variation distances to strategies as follows: Given two strategies σ i and σ ′ i for player i the variation distance between the strategies is
i.e., it is the supremum over the variation distance of the distributions used by the strategies for finite-prefixes of plays. 6 they do not explicitly show that the constant is 1 − (δ min ) n , but it follows easily from an inspection of the proof Coupling and coupling lemma. Given a pair of distributions, a coupling is a probability distribution over the joint set of possible outcomes. Let Z be a finite set. For distributions d 1 and d 2 over the finite set Z, a coupling ω is a distribution over Z × Z, such that for all z ∈ Z we have z ′ ∈Z ω(z, z ′ ) = d 1 (z) and also for all z ′ ∈ Z we have
One of the most important properties of coupling is the coupling lemma [1] of which we only mention and use the second part: 
,
for each player i and state s.
Proof. Fix σ and σ ′ according to the lemma statement. For any prefix of a play P 
and thus, we can create a coupling ω = (X
. Then, consider some state s and consider a play P s , picked using the random variables X s , then the next state is also the same, using an implicit coupling). Then according to Lemma 39, the probability that W (P ℓ s ) occurs is at least 1 − ε/4. In that case, we are interested in the probability that Q s = P s . Observe that we just need to ensure that P ℓ s and Q ℓ s are the same, since at that point the players play according to the same positional strategy, because of the smaller support. For each ℓ ′′ ≤ ℓ, if the first ℓ ′′ steps match, then the next step match with probability at least 1 − ε ℓ·k·4 · k, since each of the k players has a probability of ε ℓ·k·2 to differ in the two plays. Hence, all ℓ steps match with probability at least 1 − ε ℓ·k·4 · ℓ · k = 1 − ε/4. Hence, with probability at least 1 − ε/2 we have that P s equals Q s and thus, especially, the payoff for each player must be the same in that case. But observe that P s is distributed like plays under σ and Q s is distributed like plays under σ ′ and the statement follows.
We will next show that we only need to consider deviations to player-stationary strategies for the purpose of player-stationary equilibria.
Lemma 41. For all player-stationary strategy profiles σ and each player i, there exists a pure player-stationary strategy σ
Proof. Observe first that it does not matter what player i does if he has already lost, and we can consider him to play some fixed positional strategy in that case. Also, when the remaining players play according to σ, we can view the game as being an MDP, in the games G Π . The objective of player i is then to reach a sub-game of G Π and a state in that sub-game, from which he cannot lose. But it is well-known that such reachability objectives have positional optimal strategies in MDPs. Hence, this strategy forms a pure player-stationary strategy in the original game.
We will use Lemma 3 from [11] . The proof only appears in [10] , where the lemma is Lemma 4. We are now ready to show the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 43. For all concurrent stochastic games with all k safety players, for all 0 < ε < 1 4 , there exists a playerstationary strategy profile σ that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium and has roundedness at most
Proof. Fix some player-stationary strategy profile σ that forms a Nash-equilibrium and some 0 < ε < 1 4 and let
Consider some distribution d 1 over some set Z. Observe that for each distribution d 2 with smaller support than d 1 and such that |d 1 
. Then, applying Lemma 42, for q = ℓ·k·4·m ε and Z = Supp(d), to each probability distribution d defining σ, we see that there exists a player-stationary strategy profile
and (2) σ ′ i has smaller support than σ i ; and (3) σ
) is a fraction with denominator q. Observe that the strategy has roundedness q.
We now argue that σ ′ is an ε-Nash equilibrium. Consider some player i and a player-stationary strategy σ ′′ i maximizing the probability that player i wins when the remaining players play according to σ ′ , which is known to exists by Lemma 41. From Lemma 40, we have that 
Exponential lower bound on patience
In this section, we show that Ω((δ min ) −(n−3)/6 ) patience is required, for each strategy profile that forms an ε-Nash equilibrium, for any 0 < ε < . The probabilities are as follows: The probability of each dashed edge is 1 − δ min ; and the probability of each dotted edge is δ min ; and the probability of each solid edge is 1. The only exception is the edges from v s , where the probability is written on each edge (it is 
). The objective of player 1 is (Safety, S \ {⊥}) and the objective of player 2 is (Safety, S \ {⊤}). See Figure 5 for an illustration of G δmin 2 . Near-zero-sum property. Observe that either ⊥ or ⊤ is reached with probability 1 (and once ⊤ or ⊥ is reached, the game stays there). The reasoning is as follows: there is a probability of at least (δ min ) 2c to reach either ⊤ or ⊥ within the next 2c + 1 steps from any state. If the current state is v s , then the next state is either v 1 or v 2 , and from v 1 or v 2 through v ℓ j for each ℓ from 1 to 2c − 1, for some j, either ⊤ or ⊥ is reached, and each of the steps from v 1 or v 2 onward happens with probability at least δ min , no matter the choice of the players. Hence, the game is in essence zero-sum, since with probability 1 precisely one player wins. Proof overview. Our proof has two parts. We show that there is a strategy for player i, for each i, that ensures that against all strategies for the other player, the payoff is at least 1 2 for player i. Also, we show that for each strategy of player i with patience at most (δ min ) −2/3·c , there is a strategy for the other player such that the payoff is less than 1 6 for player i. This then allows us to show that no strategy profile that forms a Observe that fixing σ 1 as the strategy for player 1, the game turns into an MDP for player 2. Such games have a positional strategy ensuring that the payoff for player 2 is as large as possible. Going through all four candidates for σ 2 , one can see that max σ2 u(G, v s , σ 1 , σ 2 , 2) = 1 2 . Because of the near-zero-sum property, this minimizes the payoff for player 1 (since u(G, v s , σ 1 , σ 2 , 1) + u(G, v s , σ 1 , σ 2 , 2) = 1), which is then inf σ2 u(G, v s , σ 1 , σ 2 , 1) = 1 2 . The strategy for player 2 follows from σ 1 and the symmetry of the game.
We next argue that if player i uses a low-patience strategy, then the opponent can ensure low payoff for player i. . Proof. Consider first player 1 (the argument for player 2 follows from symmetry). Let σ 1 be some strategy with patience at most (δ min ) −(n−3)/6 = (δ min ) −2/3·c . The pure strategy σ 2 is defined given σ 1 as follows. For plays P To argue that u(G, v s , σ 1 , σ 2 , 2) > 1 − 1 6 , we consider a play P vs picked according to (σ 1 , σ 2 ), such that either ⊥ or ⊤ is eventually reached. This is true with probability 1. Consider the last round ℓ, such that v ℓ = v j , for some j = 1, 2. We now consider four cases: Either we have that 2 . The probability to eventually reach ⊥ is then at least the minimum probability to eventually reach ⊥ in each of the four cases. In case (2) and case (4), we see that player 2 wins with probability 1. In case (1) observe that from a round ℓ ′ where σ 1 (P 2 ) > 0 player 1 wins (i.e., reaches ⊤ before entering v s again) with probability (1 − (δ min ) 2/3·c ) · (δ min ) c < (δ min ) c and player 2 wins (i.e., reaches ⊥ before entering v s again) with probability (δ min ) 2/3·c . Hence, the probability that player 1 wins if such a round is round ℓ is at most where the last inequality comes from that c ≥ 1 and δ min < 6 −3 . In case (3) observe that from a round ℓ ′ where
2 ) > 0 player 1 wins (i.e., reaches ⊤ before entering v s again) with probability at most (1 − (δ min ) 2/3·c ) · (δ min ) 2c < (δ min ) 2c and player 2 wins (i.e., reaches ⊥ before entering v s again) with probability at least (δ min ) 2/3·c · (δ min ) c = (δ min ) 5/3·c . Hence, the probability that player 1 wins if such a round is round ℓ is at most where the last inequality comes from that c ≥ 1 and δ min < 6 −3 . The desired result follows. 
Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we discuss some important features and interesting technical aspects of our results. Finally we conclude with some remarks.
Important features of results
We now highlight two important features of our results, namely, the surprising aspects and the significance of the results. Surprising aspects of our results. We discuss three surprising aspects of our result. 1. The doubly-exponential lower bound on patience. For concurrent safety games, the properties of strategies resemble that of concurrent discounted games. In both cases, (1) optimal strategies exist, (2) there exist stationary strategies that are optimal, and (3) locally optimal strategies (that play optimally in every state with respect to the matrix games with values) are optimal. The other class of concurrent games where optimal stationary strategies exist are concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games, however, in contrast to safety and discounted games, in concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games not all locally optimal strategies are optimal. However, though for concurrent discounted games as well for concurrent ergodic mean-payoff games, the optimal bound on the patience of ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential, we show a doubly-exponential lower bound on patience of ǫ-optimal strategies for concurrent safety games, for ǫ > 0. 2. The lower bound example. The second surprising aspect of our result is the lower bound example itself, which had been elusive for safety games. The closer the lower bound example is to known examples, the greater is its value, as it is easier to understand, and illustrates the simplicity of our elusive example. Our example is obtained as follows: We consider the Purgatory games (n + 1, m), which has two value classes, and in this game positional (pure memoryless) optimal strategies exist for the safety player. We simplify the game by making the start state a deterministic state with one action for each player that with probability one goes to the next state. Remark 51 (Nature of strategies for the reachability player). Another important feature of our result is as follows: for zero-sum concurrent stochastic games, the characterization of [19] of ǫ-optimal strategies as monomial strategies for reachability objectives, separates the description of the strategies as a part that is a function of ǫ, and a part that is independent ǫ. The previous double-exponential lower bound on patience from [22, 20] shows that the part dependent on ǫ requires double-exponential patience, whereas the part that is independent only requires linear patience. A witness for ǫ-optimal strategies in Purgatory (as described in [14] 
Concluding remarks
In this work, we established the strategy complexity of zero-sum and non-zero-sum concurrent games with safety and reachability objectives. Our most important result is the doubly-exponential lower bound on patience for ǫ-optimal strategies, for ǫ > 0, for the safety player in concurrent zero-sum games. Note that roundedness is at least patience, and we present upper bounds for roundedness that match our lower bound for patience, and thus we establish tight bounds both for roundedness and patience. Our results also imply tight bounds on "granularity" of strategies (i.e., the minimal difference between two probabilities). Since patience is the minimum positive probability, and some actions can be played with probability 0, a lower bound on patience is a lower bound on granularity, and an upper bound on roundedness is an upper bound on granularity. Finally, there are many interesting directions of future work. The first question is the complexity of the value problem for concurrent safety games. While our results show that explicitly guessing strategies does not yield desired complexity results, an interesting question is whether new techniques can be developed to show that concurrent safety games can be decided in coNP in general. A second interesting question is whether variants of strategy-iteration algorithm can be developed that does not explicitly modify strategies, and does not have worst-case exponential-space complexity.
